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MEET THE PRESS
Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak

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SUNDAY, JANUARY 27, 1963

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STAT

MODERATOR: Ned Brooks

GUEST: The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

PANEL: James Reston, New York Times
Stewart Honsley, United Press
International
Elie Abel, NBC News
Lawrence E. Spivak, Permanent Panel
Member

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MR. BROOKS: This is Ned Brooks, inviting you to
MEET THE PRESS.

(Announcement)

MR. BROOKS: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is the

Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk. His book, entitled "Winds of Freedom" will be published tomorrow.

We will start the questions now with Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent member of the MEET THE PRESS panel.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Secretary, there is growing concern in the United States again about Soviet military power in Cuba. Can you give the American people any assurance that there are no nuclear warheads in Cuba today?

SECRETARY RUSK: We do not believe that there are nuclear warheads in Cuba today, but of course this is a problem of proving the negative. This is one of the reasons why we were so anxious to establish detailed on-site inspection in Cuba and this we have not been able to do.

MR. SPIVAK: Is it not true that the Mig fighters -- I think you have said that you have some assurance that there are no missiles in Cuba.

SECRETARY RUSK: That is correct.

MR. SPIVAK: But isn't it true that a Mig can carry a nuclear warhead and can carry it 700 miles into the United States?

SECRETARY RUSK: It is true that the Mig fighter, just as some of our fighters, can in fact carry nuclear warheads. These fighters have been coming into Cuba for many months. It has been our judgment that they have been consistent with a defensive capability on that island.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Secretary, I have heard reports that Russian aviators have been flying Migs in Cuba in maneuvers. Are any of those reports true, so far as you know?

SECRETARY RUSK: Yes, there have been Russians flying those Migs as well as Russians training Cubans to fly others.

MR. SPIVAK: You have said that we in this hemisphere could not accept as a normal situation any Soviet military presence in Cuba. Now according to reports there are some 15,000 to 17,000 troops, Russian troops and technicians in Cuba. And Mr. Khrushchev can remove those although he may not be able to force Mr. Castro to have on-site inspection. Why hasn't he removed those?

SECRETARY RUSK: The Soviet military aid program and buildup in Cuba started last July. That reached the crescendo, of course, with the missiles and the bombers which were dealt with in October and early November. There remains a substantial Soviet military presence in Cuba.

As the President indicated in his November 20 press conference, there has^d been some indication from the Soviet Union that those forces that were there for the servicing and protection of those missiles would be removed in due course.

We have seen some out-traffic of Soviet military personnel in recent weeks, but we are very much interested in the continuation of that out-traffic.

There are in Cuba at the present time, for example,

four relatively small Soviet combat groups, heavily armed, whose presence there is, I think, a matter of some real concern. But the underlying factor is that this hemisphere, including the United States, does not look upon a Soviet military presence in Cuba as a normal condition. It must be our policy as indicated at Punta del Este in January that the penetration of this hemisphere by Marxist-Leninist regime, backed from the outside, is unacceptable in the hemisphere so as a matter of policy we must, I think, anticipate that these forces will be removed and that Cuba someday will rejoin the hemisphere as a loyal part of it.

MR. SPIVAK: Well, Mr. Secretary, I don't quite understand this thing. Have the Russians indicated to us in any way at the present time that they are going to remove those troops? We were prepared to go to nuclear war if necessary in order to get offensive missiles out. Now what are we doing about the troops, are we just sitting back and allowing them to take the initiative in getting rid of them when and if they want to?

SECRETARY RUSK: While the missiles were going out, we said relatively little about the bombers, as you will recall. When the missiles got out we gave a lot of attention to the bombers and they were removed.

Now this Soviet military installation there, the surface-to-air missiles, the anti-air missiles, these combat

forces are a matter of concern and as I have indicated we have had some indication from the Soviet Union that these forces, at least portions of them, will be removed in due course.

As long as there is a Soviet military presence in Cuba then this is an abnormal situation which will have to be a matter of great concern to the hemisphere and to the United States.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Secretary, what do you mean by "due course," and what do they mean by "due course"? It has been several months now that those troops have been there and several months now since we were prepared to take the risk of all-out war.

Are we doing nothing at all to take them out?

SECRETARY RUSK: The critical stage was reached when there were in Cuba massive offensive capabilities represented by these missiles and bombers. That we have gotten over, so far as we can tell.

The next stage is to find ways and means of reducing the continued Soviet presence and the continued propaganda and other threats to this hemisphere.

MR. SPIVAK: Well, all Mr. Khrushchev has to do to get them out is say "Get out," to them. Is that the answer?

SECRETARY RUSK: That is correct, and when he said "In due course -- we of course are very much interested in

this time factor. The fact that they have been moving out over the last several weeks is a matter of some interest to us. As long as that out-traffic continues, then that is a gain, but we are interested in whether that out-traffic will now continue.

MR. BROOKS: We will be back with MEET THE PRESS and more questions for our guest, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, but first this message.

(Announcement)

MR. BROOKS: Now resuming our interview, our guest today is the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk. You have just met Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent member of the panel. Our other reporters today are James Reston of the New York Times, Stewart Mensley of United Press International and Elio Abel of NBC News.

We will continue the questions now with Mr. Reston.

MR. RESTON: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to turn to this important meeting in Brussels tomorrow of the Common Market countries on British entry into the Common Market. Will there be a communication from the President or from this government to Chancellor Adenauer before that meeting in answer to his last letter to the President?

SECRETARY RUSK: I would think there would not be. There has been very close consultation between us and all governments in Europe directly affected by this meeting,

but I would not anticipate an actual letter from the President to Chancellor Adenauer.

MR. RESTON: You will remember some time ago there was considerable criticism by the Democratic Party of the Republicans when Mr. Dulles was in the State Department at the time that the EDC collapsed, the European Defense Community, and the charge at that time was that we were not prepared with an alternate policy. Now do we have an alternate policy if Britain is denied entrance into the Common Market?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, Mr. Reston, there is a very important meeting tomorrow in Brussels, as you indicated. I don't want either to prejudice or prejudge that meeting. The immediate question before the Six is whether and how to proceed with discussions with the United Kingdom on entering into the Common Market.

Now obviously this is not just a question of the entry of the United Kingdom. It does affect the grand design of what kind of Europe we are to have in the years ahead, what kind of an Atlantic Community, and so I think it is worth our identifying the central elements in that design.

The first has been an increasingly cohesive and unified Europe. The second element has been increasingly intimate relationships between that Europe and North America. And the third has been a strengthening and improvement of

relations between these great countries of the North Atlantic and countries in other parts of the world who have been multiplying by the dozens in recent years.

Now this grand design came about by the recognition on both sides of the Atlantic, after World War II, that the underlying facts of our situation required cohesion in Europe, intimacy across the Atlantic, strength of this great Atlantic Community and leadership throughout the rest of the world.

Now this worked its way through the Marshall Plan, through NATO, the adhesion of Turkey and Greece to NATO, the admission of Germany to NATO. I think the strength of this great movement is reflected in the fact that when the European Defense Community was rejected by the French Parliament in 1954, immediately the countries of this great community, at that time under the initiative of Great Britain, moved at once to bring Germany into NATO and to build the great strength of NATO which exists at the present time.

This grand design is compelled by the necessities of our situation, as well as by the promise of the future and I do not believe that these present discussions, discussions which are made possible by the strength of NATO to which the United States has made such a massive contribution, I do not believe that these present discussions

will set that grand design off track.

MR. RESTON: When you ran into the kind of trouble, though, we got with President de Gaulle about the grand design challenging the whole thing, was there any communication between this government and de Gaulle after the press conference?

SECRETARY RUSK: There have been discussions, but this is a matter about which there has not been direct, personal discussion with President de Gaulle on the part of our President, but we do keep in touch.

MR. HENSLEY: Mr. Secretary, of course your grand design has run into Mr. de Gaulle's grand design, and dealing with him has been described by some people as trying to tip over a statue that is bolted to the ground.

In view of the fact that his policy seems to many to be based on diminishing or eliminating the U. S. presence on the continent, keeping Britain from having any sort of a role in the new European unity, is it possible that he might, in the creation or seeking to create his third force, turn to Moscow and make the sort of a pact he made with them just after the war which he acknowledged was made to give him a lever against Germany?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, I think it is premature to try to judge in great detail exactly what his ideas about the future might be. We did get a good deal of information

from his press conference about some of those ideas. But I think that the rest of Europe has some ideas on these subjects and indeed a great many people in France itself.

You see the American presence in Europe was a return to Europe after World War II. We had no allies after World War II except those that were formed to fight Germany and Japan. After a peace treaty with Germany it was expected that we would come home.

Now several things happened. Stalin turned to pressures against Western Europe. He disregarded the peace treaties that had been made affecting the countries of Eastern Europe. The seizure of Czechoslovakia. The guerrilla action against Greece. The Berlin blockade. And all of these things required the West to give new attention to the defense requirements of the West. This is why the Marshall Plan and NATO came into existence.

Now the American presence there has been based upon some very elementary notions. The one is that the United States can not be secure unless Western Europe is secure. The other is that the defense of Western Europe requires the participation of the United States. That the defense of these two great areas, given the situation on the other side of the Iron Curtain, is in fact indivisible. Now these are the hard facts of the present day situation and I don't see how we can get around them in the present

discussion.

MR. HENSLEY: Another harsh fact, of course, is Chancellor Adenauer's position and I am wondering whether you are satisfied that he has done all he could or should to influence de Gaulle, particularly on the Common Market question.

SECRETARY RUSK: Chancellor Adenauer, one of the greatest of Europeans, has been working for years in two directions which have been welcomed in the United States and for which he has had our full support. The one has been working toward a unified Europe and the other toward reconciliation between Germany and France. Both of these would be great historic developments. After all, we ourselves have been in two World Wars which started in fights within Western Europe and if after several centuries we can say that will no longer happen, this is a very great thing for us.

So we hope very much that Chancellor Adenauer will not be faced with a situation in which he will have to choose between his own two great objectives: the unity of Europe and reconciliation with France.

MR. ABEL: Mr. Secretary, both the Turkish and Italian governments have announced in the past few days that our obsolete Jupiter missiles are being removed from their territories and won't be replaced on their territories.

Instead we will send Polaris submarines into the Mediterranean.

Doesn't this give Khrushchev what he was asking for at the time of the Cuban crisis?

SECRETARY RUSK: No, because this is a part of the modernization program throughout NATO including the weapons system of the United States. We have been at that for some time. We have discussed this problem in NATO long before the Cuban crisis and with the governments concerned. This affects Polaris, it affects the missiles in Britain which are being phased out, it affects the availability of the Polaris submarine. It has to do with improvements in short-range missiles, in aircraft, in conventional weapons. It is a part of the necessary modernization program of the entire Western armament.

MR. ABEL: How soon does the switch begin? I am wondering, because it seems to me there is a psychological effect in having announced these Jupiter missiles are obsolete.

SECRETARY RUSK: I think they will occur in phase with the arrival of the Polaris submarines on station.

MR. BROOKS: Time is running short. If you will keep your questions short I am sure the Secretary will do likewise with his answers.

MR. ABEL: May I go ahead?

MR. BROOKS: Yes.

MR. ABEL: Mr. Secretary, you seemed to put off for

the moment any reappraisal. I am not asking you to agonize but even any reappraisal of American Policy as a result of this de Gaulle stand. Is this because you believe Mr. de Gaulle can be brought around to a more cooperative attitude or is there some other motivation?

SECRETARY RUSK: No, I think when we try to think about alternatives to the Grand Design of the West as it has evolved since World War II, we can only ask the question: What is happening on the other side of the Iron Curtain, what is the problem over there?

If some day the Soviet Union -- and we see no present signs of it -- should turn its energies to the unfinished tasks of its own people, if we could make some real headway toward disarmament which we hope can be possible, then it is conceivable that alternatives would become open to us. But so long as we have the present factual situation and the confrontation of power in the world, and the purposes of the Soviet Union, I don't see any alternative to the main lines of Western policy in these past few years.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Secretary, in fact can the Atlantic Alliance flourish without greater cooperation from General de Gaulle?

SECRETARY RUSK: Just as we have never ourselves wanted to dominate Europe, because we did not want to and the Europeans did not want us to, I am quite sure that Europe does not wish to be dominated by any particular country. So that it seems to me that this great western community has been moving on, despite the fact that at one time or another, one country or another has had different views on a particular aspect of it. I think this movement is required by the historical situation, it is supported by the wishes of the peoples concerned throughout

both continents and therefore I think we can expect the general movement to continue.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Secretary, do you mind answering my question. Do you think the Atlantic Alliance can flourish without greater cooperation from General de Gaulle?

SECRETARY RUSK: If you are talking about the Alliance in military terms, let me say --

MR. SPIVAK: You know what I am talking about, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY RUSK: I don't believe the Alliance has been stronger or more unified on the elementary problems of security than it has been in these past several months, this past year, or today. Now there is no question about the attitude of the Alliance if confronted with a challenge from the Soviet Union, and so I would not be, today, too much concerned on that point.

MR. SPIVAK: But can it flourish without his full cooperation? Greater cooperation than he is now giving us?

SECRETARY RUSK: On these elementary security commitments there is no question about ~~generally~~ President de Gaulle's stand.

MR. RESTON: What were you implying in your remarks about the Soviet Union in answer to Elie Abel's question?

SECRETARY RUSK: What I was saying there was that unless there is a major change, and we do not see such a major change in the making in the foreseeable future, that I do not see any

major alternative to the lines of policy pursued by the West in building up the unity of Europe, the intimacy of the North Atlantic and the strength of the NATO alliance.

MR. RESTON: Are we not in a difficult position on this whole argument with Europe in the sense that we are constantly asking them to do things to unify and give up sovereignty that we are not prepared to do ourselves?

SECRETARY RUSK: I don't think so because after all these are ideas developed primarily in Europe. This is a European notion, a European consciousness, a European requirement and necessity, if you like.

No, we are not driving and pressing Europe to do something which we think Europe doesn't want to do, but what we are prepared to do, as President Kennedy indicated in his July 4 speech, is to join with a unified Europe for -- in a great Atlantic Community with its own relations strong across the Atlantic, outward-looking to the rest of the world, as a great citadel of freedom throughout the world.

MR. HENSLEY: Mr. Secretary, turning to another area, the United States rushed some emergency military aid to India after the Red Chinese attacks. I am wondering if you could tell us how deep and how ~~expensive~~⁸ is our emergency commitment and how much have you made in the way of a long-range commitment to Nehru?

SECRETARY RUSK: The emergency commitment is relatively modest in terms of major defense budgets. I think in the general nature of perhaps \$60 million on our side, matched by an equal amount from others. This is primarily for infantry equipment, for mountain warfare.

Other aid is a matter of future discussion and study. It has been announced that we are sending out a team with the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia to look at the air defense situation in India. Of course this will depend somewhat on further development of the situation.

MR. WENSLEY: What about these reports that Nehru has asked for possible intervention of the U. S. Air Force if he gets into real trouble. At the same time in Moscow his representatives say that the Russian Migs will be coming through any day, the aircraft factory is started and so forth. I would think you would want to take a pretty deep look at this situation before you got too involved in a long-range commitment.

SECRETARY RUSK: I think a deep look is the purpose of the visit of these four countries' delegations on this air defense mission which is now on the way out there.

MR. ABEL: If China should be able to explode a crude nuclear device in a couple of years--of course it would be many years before she had a sophisticated delivery system --

but the mere possession or explosion of this would have a powerful force of nuclear blackmail in Southeast Asia, wouldn't it, Mr. Secretary? How could we meet that?

SECRETARY RUSK: I think the psychologic and political effect of the achievement of a nuclear weapon by Red China would be very severe. It would not for many, many years affect the general strategic balance in the world, but there is no question that this would have a serious and negative effect. This is one of the reasons why we are very much interested in such a thing as a nuclear test ban, for example, or agreement which might serve to limit the transfer of weapons from one nation to another.

This is a serious problem, the possible development of a nuclear power on mainland China.

MR. ABEL: On the test ban, sir, since you mentioned it, the Russians in the past day or two have told their own people they have made about all the concessions they are going to make -- meaning two to three inspections a year. In view of this attitude after just two weeks of talk, have you any hope at all of reaching the kind of agreement that our Congress would ratify?

SECRETARY RUSK: I think the main lines of the discussion have already been laid out in the publication of the exchange of letters between the President and Mr. Khrushchev. The number of on-site inspections is an

important matter. It is not on our side just a question of a political gesture. We need an effective operational means for determining whether in fact agreements are being lived up to, particularly in that vast closed area in the heart of the Eurasian land mass. We do think this exchange of letters opened the way for some serious negotiations, serious discussion, ^{Because} ~~at these~~ on-site inspections were accepted in principle. These discussions are now going on and will continue next week. We hope they can come to a conclusion but I want to point out on our side we must have effective arrangements. Two or three on-site inspections are not enough. And a great many other things would have to be done to be sure that we know where we are in policing of a test ban.

MR. ABEL: Quite a few people in Congress, sir, seem to be not at all persuaded that even eight or ten inspections are enough and there is some grumbling about the President's decision to suspend these tests underground in Nevada.

Is there a time limit attached to that suspension or do we hold off indefinitely?

SECRETARY RUSK: This is a temporary suspension of a particular test during these talks. After all the tests were delayed for quite a period through an electricians' strike and we thought if a little further delay would make it possible to find out if it is possible to get a test

ban that this would be worthwhile.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Secretary, we have been tricked and cheated and lied to by the Russians before on several occasions. On testing, for example, and in Cuba. Supposing we did get inspection, what would that mean, couldn't they trick us once again?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, this is a matter for the technicians and the military experts to determine as to what is required. We have had considerable improvement in our means of detection in the last two years, for example, in connection with our VEELA tests. The Soviets claim that they have instruments which are fully effective in scrutinizing tests. If they have them, we don't have them --

MR. BROOKS: Mr. Secretary, I am going to have to interrupt at this point. I see that our time is up. Thank you very much, Secretary Rusk, for being with us. I will tell you about next week's guest on MEET THE PRESS after this message.

(Announcement.)

THE ANNOUNCER: For a printed copy of today's interview, send ten cents in coin and a stamped, self-addressed envelope to Nettle Press, 809 Channing Street, N. W., Washington 18, D. C.

MR. BROOKS: Next week our guest on MEET THE PRESS will be the two Republican leaders of Congress, Senator Everett Dirksen and Congressman Charles Halleck.

Now this is Ned Brooks saying good-bye for Secretary of State Rusk and MEET THE PRESS.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 30 January 1963
TO: Mr. Cline		
ROOM NO. 7E32	BUILDING Hqs.	
REMARKS:		
<p>Here is a copy of Dean Rusk's appearance on Meet the Press, Sunday, 27 January 1963. Spivak was very sharp in his questioning of Mr. Rusk regarding Soviet military power in Cuba. In the first six pages is covered Spivak's questioning.</p> <p>The on-site inspections angle is touched upon on pages 18, 19, and 20.</p>		
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